Works in Progress
Can Group Agents Trust and Be Trusted?
What little has been said about this question indicates that, no, group agents cannot trust or be trusted. There are three ways philosophers have suggested this: some have explicitly said (though without argument) that only individual human moral agents can trust and be trusted. Deborah Tollefson, the only group agency theorist to directly consider the question, concludes group agents cannot trust or be trusted because trust (at least on the account she adopts) requires phenomenal consciousness, which she (and most others) say group agents lack. Katherine Hawley has argued that, with respect to groups, we can eliminate the distinction between trust and mere reliance and not lose anything of conceptual importance. This last claim is significant because virtually all philosophers of trust agree that a viable account of trust must be able to adequately distinguish trust from mere reliance. If no such distinction is needed with groups, then it would appear group agents are incapable of trusting or being trusted. In this paper I argue that group agents can indeed trust and be trusted. To see this, I begin by arguing that an appropriate account of the nature of trust does not require phenomenal consciousness, like many theorists of trust have assumed, and that all trust requires are capacities group agents possess. I then discuss the extent to which group agents can trust. The significance of this is that, if I am right, then it will turn out that group agents are capable of participating in one of the most important moral activities moral agents engage in, the activity of trusting other agents. Given the important role of trust in our moral lives, inasmuch as group agents are capable of trusting and being trusted, we will be harder pressed to deny the robust moral status of group agents, something many group agency theorists seem at pains to do.
What little has been said about this question indicates that, no, group agents cannot trust or be trusted. There are three ways philosophers have suggested this: some have explicitly said (though without argument) that only individual human moral agents can trust and be trusted. Deborah Tollefson, the only group agency theorist to directly consider the question, concludes group agents cannot trust or be trusted because trust (at least on the account she adopts) requires phenomenal consciousness, which she (and most others) say group agents lack. Katherine Hawley has argued that, with respect to groups, we can eliminate the distinction between trust and mere reliance and not lose anything of conceptual importance. This last claim is significant because virtually all philosophers of trust agree that a viable account of trust must be able to adequately distinguish trust from mere reliance. If no such distinction is needed with groups, then it would appear group agents are incapable of trusting or being trusted. In this paper I argue that group agents can indeed trust and be trusted. To see this, I begin by arguing that an appropriate account of the nature of trust does not require phenomenal consciousness, like many theorists of trust have assumed, and that all trust requires are capacities group agents possess. I then discuss the extent to which group agents can trust. The significance of this is that, if I am right, then it will turn out that group agents are capable of participating in one of the most important moral activities moral agents engage in, the activity of trusting other agents. Given the important role of trust in our moral lives, inasmuch as group agents are capable of trusting and being trusted, we will be harder pressed to deny the robust moral status of group agents, something many group agency theorists seem at pains to do.
Why Group Agents Have Fundamental Rights
Most group agency theorists hold that groups can be ontologically irreducible moral agents in their own right, liable to acquire duties and obligations and be held morally responsible for their actions. But most such theorists also hold that such group moral agents lack fundamental rights--that is, rights explainable and justifiable exclusively in terms of the group itself and not its constitutive individuals. They hold this position on the grounds that something more than rational moral agency is required to ground fundamental rights. Usually, this extra factor is taken to be phenomenal consciousness, something most people agree that group agents lack. I call this the dominant view. The few direct challenges to the dominant view in the literature seek to undermine in some way the notion that group agents lack phenomenal consciousness, thus enabling the grounding of fundamental group rights. In this paper I also challenge the dominant view, but in a novel way. I argue that, even without phenomenal consciousness, we have reason to ascribe fundamental rights to group agents. I show this by analyzing the most prominent theories of what rights do for rightsholders, arguing that all but one strand of one of the main kinds of theory of the function of rights ground rights in capacities of rightsholders that group agents possess. From the perspective of what rights do for rightsholders, there is little reason to deny fundamental rights to group agents. After acknowledging one theory of the function of rights that relies on phenomenal consciousness, I then discuss the reasons we have to resist the notion that group agents lack phenomenal consciousness, thereby further undermining the dominant view.
Most group agency theorists hold that groups can be ontologically irreducible moral agents in their own right, liable to acquire duties and obligations and be held morally responsible for their actions. But most such theorists also hold that such group moral agents lack fundamental rights--that is, rights explainable and justifiable exclusively in terms of the group itself and not its constitutive individuals. They hold this position on the grounds that something more than rational moral agency is required to ground fundamental rights. Usually, this extra factor is taken to be phenomenal consciousness, something most people agree that group agents lack. I call this the dominant view. The few direct challenges to the dominant view in the literature seek to undermine in some way the notion that group agents lack phenomenal consciousness, thus enabling the grounding of fundamental group rights. In this paper I also challenge the dominant view, but in a novel way. I argue that, even without phenomenal consciousness, we have reason to ascribe fundamental rights to group agents. I show this by analyzing the most prominent theories of what rights do for rightsholders, arguing that all but one strand of one of the main kinds of theory of the function of rights ground rights in capacities of rightsholders that group agents possess. From the perspective of what rights do for rightsholders, there is little reason to deny fundamental rights to group agents. After acknowledging one theory of the function of rights that relies on phenomenal consciousness, I then discuss the reasons we have to resist the notion that group agents lack phenomenal consciousness, thereby further undermining the dominant view.
Ontological Ambiguity
Philosophers have recently identified different forms of injustice that are distinctively ontological in nature. Ontological injustice can be broadly construed as occurring when an individual is socially constructed (or not) as a member of some social kind and their being socially constructed (or not) is in some sense unjust to them. This kind of injustice occurs “at the level of being,” affecting individuals simply in virtue of their being socially constructed in a certain way (Jenkins 2023, 24). Examples include actions one is entitled to perform being made impossible or unintelligible on the basis of one’s social construction (Ásta 2019), being unjustly excluded from a socially constructed kind (Dembroff 2018; Richardson 2023), or it being unjustly indeterminate whether one is a member of a socially constructed kind (Richardson 2023). I identify a distinctive form of ontological injustice that I call ontological ambiguity. Focusing on a particular example from the philosophy of immigration literature, I argue that ontological ambiguity occurs when an individual is simultaneously socially constructed as a member of two social kinds that are characterized by conflicting sets of constraints and enablements. After briefly defending a particular view of social construction, I analyze the phenomenon of ontological ambiguity and the nature of the wrong it comprises. I argue that ontological ambiguity constitutes an injustice insofar as it unjustly undermines one’s agency in a way that facilitates hermeneutic injustice. Specifically, because of the uncertainty regarding which set of constraints and enablements will apply to them, ontologically ambiguous individuals cannot interpret their social context in a way that issues in practical guidance on how to effectively exercise their agency. I then apply this analysis of ontological ambiguity to the literature surrounding such unauthorized immigrants to show that such literature is at best incomplete, arguing that it is inherently unjust for a state to implement policies that render immigrants (or anyone else for that matter) ontologically ambgiuous.
Philosophers have recently identified different forms of injustice that are distinctively ontological in nature. Ontological injustice can be broadly construed as occurring when an individual is socially constructed (or not) as a member of some social kind and their being socially constructed (or not) is in some sense unjust to them. This kind of injustice occurs “at the level of being,” affecting individuals simply in virtue of their being socially constructed in a certain way (Jenkins 2023, 24). Examples include actions one is entitled to perform being made impossible or unintelligible on the basis of one’s social construction (Ásta 2019), being unjustly excluded from a socially constructed kind (Dembroff 2018; Richardson 2023), or it being unjustly indeterminate whether one is a member of a socially constructed kind (Richardson 2023). I identify a distinctive form of ontological injustice that I call ontological ambiguity. Focusing on a particular example from the philosophy of immigration literature, I argue that ontological ambiguity occurs when an individual is simultaneously socially constructed as a member of two social kinds that are characterized by conflicting sets of constraints and enablements. After briefly defending a particular view of social construction, I analyze the phenomenon of ontological ambiguity and the nature of the wrong it comprises. I argue that ontological ambiguity constitutes an injustice insofar as it unjustly undermines one’s agency in a way that facilitates hermeneutic injustice. Specifically, because of the uncertainty regarding which set of constraints and enablements will apply to them, ontologically ambiguous individuals cannot interpret their social context in a way that issues in practical guidance on how to effectively exercise their agency. I then apply this analysis of ontological ambiguity to the literature surrounding such unauthorized immigrants to show that such literature is at best incomplete, arguing that it is inherently unjust for a state to implement policies that render immigrants (or anyone else for that matter) ontologically ambgiuous.
Political Rioting as Negative Reciprocity
Recently philosophers have begun theorizing acts of political disobedience that have traditionally been viewed as beyond the limits of civil disobedience. Some argue that such acts ought to count as civil disobedience once this notion is properly understood. Others argue that, even if considered uncivil disobedience, these acts are nevertheless justifiable (and even potentially obligatory). One issue with this scholarship is that it considers such acts together without providing sustained analysis of any particular kind of disobedient act. This impedes “the suitably complex, nuanced analysis we need” to properly theorize the various forms of disobedience we see in our contemporary political contexts (Scheuerman 2022, 982). In the spirit of a suitably nuanced analysis, this paper focuses exclusively on political rioting as a form of disobedience. I examine what political rioting is—how, that is, we ought to understand what a political rioter is doing when he engages in a given act of political rioting. I argue that the best way to understand political rioting that responds to severe and pervasive injustice is as negative reciprocity. Given what I take such political rioting to consist in, I argue that a norm of reciprocity is what undergirds the activity of political rioting. As such, political rioting as negative reciprocity can situate itself firmly within the bounds—even if on the “outer edge”—of political practice, evincing a commitment to the existing political project broadly within the confines of which one engages in political rioting (Rawls 1999, 322). Indeed, I take it that a commitment to the mutual political project of living together under conditions of justice is central to what motivates the cases of political rioting I have in mind. Understanding political rioting as negative reciprocity shows how consistent the practice can be with the norms that ground our political obligations and therefore with some commitment to the political institutions that are at stake when instances of political rioting break out. Such an account of political rioting, moreover, will provide theorists new tools to argue, say, that political rioting should therefore count as civil disobedience. It will also provide new tools to argue that, regardless of the question of civil disobedience, political rioting can be morally justified.
Recently philosophers have begun theorizing acts of political disobedience that have traditionally been viewed as beyond the limits of civil disobedience. Some argue that such acts ought to count as civil disobedience once this notion is properly understood. Others argue that, even if considered uncivil disobedience, these acts are nevertheless justifiable (and even potentially obligatory). One issue with this scholarship is that it considers such acts together without providing sustained analysis of any particular kind of disobedient act. This impedes “the suitably complex, nuanced analysis we need” to properly theorize the various forms of disobedience we see in our contemporary political contexts (Scheuerman 2022, 982). In the spirit of a suitably nuanced analysis, this paper focuses exclusively on political rioting as a form of disobedience. I examine what political rioting is—how, that is, we ought to understand what a political rioter is doing when he engages in a given act of political rioting. I argue that the best way to understand political rioting that responds to severe and pervasive injustice is as negative reciprocity. Given what I take such political rioting to consist in, I argue that a norm of reciprocity is what undergirds the activity of political rioting. As such, political rioting as negative reciprocity can situate itself firmly within the bounds—even if on the “outer edge”—of political practice, evincing a commitment to the existing political project broadly within the confines of which one engages in political rioting (Rawls 1999, 322). Indeed, I take it that a commitment to the mutual political project of living together under conditions of justice is central to what motivates the cases of political rioting I have in mind. Understanding political rioting as negative reciprocity shows how consistent the practice can be with the norms that ground our political obligations and therefore with some commitment to the political institutions that are at stake when instances of political rioting break out. Such an account of political rioting, moreover, will provide theorists new tools to argue, say, that political rioting should therefore count as civil disobedience. It will also provide new tools to argue that, regardless of the question of civil disobedience, political rioting can be morally justified.