Published Papers
"Keeping the Friend in Epicurean Friendship," Apeiron (2021)
There seems to be universal agreement among Epicurean scholars that friendship characterized by other-concern is conceptually incompatible with Epicureanism understood as a directly egoistic theory. I reject this view, arguing that once we properly understand the nature of friendship and the Epicurean conception of our final end, we are in a position to demonstrate friendship's compatibility with, and centrality within, Epicureanism's direct egoism.
There seems to be universal agreement among Epicurean scholars that friendship characterized by other-concern is conceptually incompatible with Epicureanism understood as a directly egoistic theory. I reject this view, arguing that once we properly understand the nature of friendship and the Epicurean conception of our final end, we are in a position to demonstrate friendship's compatibility with, and centrality within, Epicureanism's direct egoism.
"Forced Separation and the Wrong of Deportation," Social Philosophy Today (2020)
This paper argues that liberal states are wrong to forcibly separate through deportation the unauthorized immigrant parents of member children and that states must therefore regularize such unauthorized immigrants. While most arguments for regularization focus on how deportation wrongs the unauthorized immigrants themselves, I ground my argument in how deportation wrongs the state's members, namely the unauthorized immigrants' member children. Specifically, forced separation through deportation wrongs affected children by violating a basic right to sustain the intimate relationships with their unauthorized immigrant parents on which they rely for their development into fully autonomous agents.
This paper argues that liberal states are wrong to forcibly separate through deportation the unauthorized immigrant parents of member children and that states must therefore regularize such unauthorized immigrants. While most arguments for regularization focus on how deportation wrongs the unauthorized immigrants themselves, I ground my argument in how deportation wrongs the state's members, namely the unauthorized immigrants' member children. Specifically, forced separation through deportation wrongs affected children by violating a basic right to sustain the intimate relationships with their unauthorized immigrant parents on which they rely for their development into fully autonomous agents.
"Unauthorized Immigrants, Reasonable Expectations, and the Right to Regularization," Social Theory and Practice (2020)
This article brings an account of reasonable expectations to bear on the question of when unauthorized immigrants have a right to be regularized--that is, to be formally guaranteed freedom from the threat of deportation. Contrary to the current literature, which implicitly relies on a flawed understanding of reasonable expectations, this article argues that only those unauthorized immigrants who have both been tacitly permitted by the state despite lacking formal authorization and have remained long enough to develop deep social roots in the state have a right to regularization.
This article brings an account of reasonable expectations to bear on the question of when unauthorized immigrants have a right to be regularized--that is, to be formally guaranteed freedom from the threat of deportation. Contrary to the current literature, which implicitly relies on a flawed understanding of reasonable expectations, this article argues that only those unauthorized immigrants who have both been tacitly permitted by the state despite lacking formal authorization and have remained long enough to develop deep social roots in the state have a right to regularization.
"Historic Injustice, Collective Agency, and Compensatory Duties," Southwest Philosophy Review (2019)
Historic injustices are injustices that happened so long ago that neither the perpetrators nor the victims of the historic injustice are alive today. This fact raises a question about whether there is anyone to whom we could justly ascribe compensatory duties for historic injustices like slavery. An intuitively powerful objection against this idea argues that since no one alive today is guilty of any relevant wrongs, there is no one to ascribe compensatory duties for historic injustice. This paper argues that conceiving of states like the United States as collective agents allows us to overcome this objection. At least in cases where states-as-collective-agents existed as collective agents at the time of the historic injustice, played a culpable role in the historic injustice, and continue existing today as the same collective agent, it is just to ascribe to those states compensatory duties for such historic injustices.
Historic injustices are injustices that happened so long ago that neither the perpetrators nor the victims of the historic injustice are alive today. This fact raises a question about whether there is anyone to whom we could justly ascribe compensatory duties for historic injustices like slavery. An intuitively powerful objection against this idea argues that since no one alive today is guilty of any relevant wrongs, there is no one to ascribe compensatory duties for historic injustice. This paper argues that conceiving of states like the United States as collective agents allows us to overcome this objection. At least in cases where states-as-collective-agents existed as collective agents at the time of the historic injustice, played a culpable role in the historic injustice, and continue existing today as the same collective agent, it is just to ascribe to those states compensatory duties for such historic injustices.
"The Right to Exclude Immigrants Does Not Imply the Right to Exclude Newcomers by Birth," Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2018)
One increasingly popular objection against arguments that defend the state's right to exclude immigrants says that such arguments entail the right to exclude newborns. I call this the newcomer-by-birth objection. If true, the newcomer-by-birth objection would seem to undermine arguments defending the state's right to exclude immigrants because most people think the state should not be able to deny citizenship to the children of citizens. This paper argues that the objection does not withstand scrutiny. The paper argues that the state cannot deny citizenship to newcomers by birth because it would violate important rights of current citizens--namely the newcomers' parents. Additionally, this paper argues that denying citizenship to newcomers by birth when their parents consent to such denial of citizenship is not unjust because it is morally akin to international adoption, a practice very few people would find morally problematic. Thus, the newcomer-by-birth objection fails to undermine arguments defending the state's right to exclude.
One increasingly popular objection against arguments that defend the state's right to exclude immigrants says that such arguments entail the right to exclude newborns. I call this the newcomer-by-birth objection. If true, the newcomer-by-birth objection would seem to undermine arguments defending the state's right to exclude immigrants because most people think the state should not be able to deny citizenship to the children of citizens. This paper argues that the objection does not withstand scrutiny. The paper argues that the state cannot deny citizenship to newcomers by birth because it would violate important rights of current citizens--namely the newcomers' parents. Additionally, this paper argues that denying citizenship to newcomers by birth when their parents consent to such denial of citizenship is not unjust because it is morally akin to international adoption, a practice very few people would find morally problematic. Thus, the newcomer-by-birth objection fails to undermine arguments defending the state's right to exclude.